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NOTES
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: UNILATERAL FEDERAL PROTECTION f
The federal system of government utilized in the United
States reserves a certain degree of sovereignty to each state. In
order to provide uniformity in matters which affect more than one
jurisdiction, it is often necessary for the federal government to
supersede state authority. It became apparent, early in the develop-
ment of the United States, that copyright protection would require
such nationwide uniformity.
Since the Articles of Confederation lacked any provision for
federal copyright protection, various states filled the void either
by continuing the common-law doctrine of protection until pub-
lication or by enacting statutory provisions. As early as 1783,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland and Rhode Island had passed
copyright legislation. Since a state's authority can extend no
farther than its jurisdictional limits, to protect his work fully an
author' had to seek protection in each state or the work could
be copied in any state in which he was not protected and then
circulated in competition with his copyrighted work.
The lack of efficient national protection afforded by unrelated
state provisions prompted James Madison to urge that the federal
government be given the power to extend patent and copyright
protection.
The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain,
to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems
with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully
coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States
cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and
most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed
at the instance of Congress.2
t Awarded First Prize in the 1967 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition,
St. John's University School of Law.
' For purposes of convenience only, the word "author" is used to
designate the creator of a work which is copyrightable under the provisions
of the federal statute.
.
2 THE FEDERALiST No. 43, at 309 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (Madison).
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With the adoption of the United States Constitution, authority to
act in the area of copyright protection was bestowed upon Congress:
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.3
Although Congress acted swiftly in passing the first copy-
right act,4 subsequent amendments have been infrequent; since
1790 there have been only three major revisions of the law.'
With minor variations, the Act of 1909 comprises the present
copyright law. The existing law provides a "dual" system of
protection, allowing the states to provide protection before a work
is published but making federal protection exclusive after publica-
tion.
Rapid technological advances, especially great developments
in the communications industry, unimagined in 1909, have resulted
in the inadequacy and obsolescence of many provisions of the
present law. Therefore, for a number of years, the communica-
tions and publishing industries have clamored for a re-evaluation
and revision of the federal statute. An extensive program of
study 6 under the auspices of the Copyright Office culminated in a
report by the Register of Copyrights urging a general revision of
the law.7 After further study and public hearings, a bill for the
general revision of the Copyright Law was introduced in the Con-
gress in 1967.8
3 U.S. Coxsr. art. I, § 8.
4 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
5 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 330,
16 Stat. 198; Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. The 1909 Act
was enacted into positive law by the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat.
652, as Title 17 of the United States Code.6A compilation of thirty-five individual studies made pursuant to this
program can be found in THE COPYRIGHT SoclM-r OP THE U.S.A., STUDmS
ON COPYRIGHT (A. Fisher Memorial ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STUDIEs
ON COPYRIGHT].
7 Register of Copvrights. Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, in 2 STUDIEs oN COPYRIGHT
1199 [hereinafter cited as REGISTER'S REPORT].8H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRoosam
LAW]. The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Emanuel
Celler. and an identical bill. S. 597, was introduced in the Senate by Senator
John L. McClellan. On February 27, 1967, the bill was approved by a
House judiciarv subcommittee and was reported back to the House Judiciary
Committee. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1967, § 1, at 20, col. 2. Subsequently,
the bill received House approval and hearings were being conducted before
a Senate Subcommittee. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1967, § 1, at 39, col. 1. A
House Report has been issued to accompany the bill. H.R. REP. No. 83,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
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The attempt to enact legislation capable of dealing with con-
temporary problems, yet flexible enough to adjust to future ad-
vances in communications and publishing, seems destined to result
in the broadest copyright revision in the history of our country.
Perhaps the most radical change, and the most fundamental char-
acteristic of the proposed law, provides for the abolition of the
"dual" system of copyright protection and substitutes in its stead
unilateral federal protection for all copyrightable works.9
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the inade-
quacies of the present "dual" system of protection and evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed "unilateral" system.
Common-Law Copyright
It is a generally accepted rule of law that copyright protec-
tion will not be extended to an abstract idea, but only to a tangible
expression of that idea."0 Thus, it is the author's manner of ex-
pression which is the subject of a copyright. For example, an artist
may not prevent another from viewing the same scene, utilizing
the same vantage point and thereby producing an identical work.
He may only prohibit his own work from being copied or ap-
propriated. Similarly, an author who verbally describes a scene
will not be given an exclusive right to the words he uses. Rather,
his arrangement of the words will be protected from wrongful
use. Two people arriving at the same result, through individual
efforts, might each be extended copyright protection."
At common law, an author's rights in his work are in the
nature of property rights. 12  As an incident of ownership, they
exist independent of statutory authority "3 and are usually styled
a "common-law copyright." That term is somewhat of an under-
statement, however, since the author's exclusive claim to his work
permits him more than the mere privilege of copying it. The
scope of these rights was settled, after much litigation, by the
House of Lords in Donaldsons v. Becket,14 wherein the court an-
swered the question:
The pending legislation is basically the same as a bill introduced near
the end of the 89th Congress. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
In October 1966, a report was issued to accompany that bill. H.R. REP.
No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
9 PROPosED LAW § 301.
10 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
"'In this regard, a copyright is distinguishable from a patent which
grants exclusive protection to the first person to register his work.
12 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
"sDesny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956),
144 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774),
[ Vor. 42
Whether at common law, an author of any book or literary composi-
tion had the sole right of first printing and publishing the same for
sale; and might bring an action against any person who printed pub-
lished and sold the same without his consent?'
5
Both issues were decided in the affirmative, 6 the court ruling that
the right to publish and print would exist in perpetuity but for
statutory provisions limiting it.'7
SLaty years later the United States Supreme Court reached
the same conclusions and considered it to be "well settled" that
an author had a perpetual right to the exclusive use of unpublished
manuscripts, but, once published, any further rights were con-
tingent upon the federal copyright statute.'
Thus, the continued existence of common-law protection de-
pends on state law 59 and can be abrogated or superseded by state
law. Upon publication, however, prior protection extended either
under the common-law doctrine or pursuant to a state statute
ceases and thereafter federal law becomes the exclusive source of
copyright protection.
An author's common-law rights are basically two-fold: first,
he has the right to the exclusive use of his work until he permits
a general publication ;2° and, second, he has the exclusive right
to make or authorize the first general publication of his work.
The protection against unauthorized use of a work is absolute;
not even "fair use," the right of others to use the owner's work
in a reasonable manner without his consent, is allowed. 21 An
author may use his work in any manner he wishes, short of a
general publication, exploit it commercially and enjoy the profits
therefrom, without fear of the work being copied or becoming part
of the public domain.
"t Ibid.
' Id. at 2409-17, 98 Eng. Rep. at 258-62. While ten of the eleven judges
agreed that an author had first publication rights, only eight agreed on
the right to a cause of action for unauthorized use.
17 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709). Pursuant to this statute authors whose works
were already in print but had not been "published" were granted the exclusive
right to print their works for 21 years after the effective date of the statute,
whereas those works not printed but composed, or yet to be composed,
were to receive a 14 year protection after the first publication.
18 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 n.1 (1834).
29 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955).
20 Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P2d
73 (1950).
21 Ibid. The right of fair use has been extended by case law interpreting
the federal statute. For a study of the fair use doctrine see Latman,
Study No. 14; Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYMGRT
781.
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Publication
Upon publication, the, author's common-law copyright ter-
minates and his work enters the public domain 22 unless further
protection is granted by federal statute.23 The Federal Copyright
Law, which specifically recognizes common-law or state protection
prior to publication, 4 begins protection of copyrightable works
after publication, if the author takes the necessary statutory steps.
The importance of publication, therefore, is clear: it serves as the
divider between the pre-publication protection of the common law,
or state law, and the post-publication protection of the federal
statute or the entrance of the work into the public domain. After
publication, an author loses all exclusive right to his work if he
does not qualify for federal statutory protection or if he fails to
take the steps necessary to obtain that protection.
Despite the legal significance of the term "publication," its
meaning has been obscured by the fact that the federal statute lacks
a definition. Conflict has arisen over whether the "publication"
which terminates an author's common-law rights is the same
"publication" as that which qualifies him for federal protection.
The conclusion that they are one and the same, although subject
to strong criticism,2 5 is supported by the fact that Section 2 of the
Copyright Law allows common-law protection only until federal
protection begins.2
6
It has been suggested that the definitional difficulties could be
eliminated by having the federal law define the word for its pur-
poses and the states define it for the purpose of determining the
limit of common-law or state protection. The danger of conflict
between the two makes this solution unacceptable. 27  Perhaps
a better solution would be a uniform federal definition.2 8
22Worchmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321 (2d Cir. 1904).
22Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
2417 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of
the author . . . of an unpublished work, at common law . . . to
prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work
without his consent.
25 Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection
of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 H~av. L. REv. 1079, 1093 (1959).
26Ibid.
27MId. at 1094. "[I]n some instances, state protection which would be
permissible under this position will conflict with the federal policy." Ibid.
28Ibid. The authors suggest two definitions: one divestitive of the
common-law right and the other investitive of the federal protection. It
has been asserted that "publication" is a federal question. Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting
opinion).
[ Vote. 42
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Since the federal law has failed to assume this burden, the
task has fallen to the courts to attempt to work out a definition
on a case-by-case approach. A summary of the case law provides
what seems to be the accepted definition of publication.
[P]ublication occurs when by consent of the copyright owner the
original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given
away, or otherwise made available to the general public, or when an
authorized offer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner
even if a sale or other such disposition does not in fact occur.
2 9
A close study of this definition indicates two major problems
which have arisen in connection with copyright protection. The
first is that the definition speaks of tangible copies. Since the
concept of common-law copyright originated when written and
printed copies were the only anticipated means of reproduction and
distribution of literary works, authors were protected only against
the misappropriation of their work in those ways. The courts
have strictly adhered to this "copy" requirement despite the de-
velopment of new methods of distribution. It is accepted, almost
without question, that the public performance or dissemination of
a work other than by copies does not result in a publication of that
work. For example, playing a musical composition has been held
not to be a publication in the absence of the distribution of copies. 30
Similarly, neither delivery of a lecture 3" nor performance before
a radio microphone 3 2 has been held to constitute publication.
Despite strong criticism,3 3 the "copy" concept of publication is
still a viable principle of law. As a result, the author has the
advantage of presenting his work to the public and profiting there-
by without "publishing" and, thus, not losing his common-law
copyright.
The second problem arising from the accepted case-law defini-
tion of publication is the requirement that the work be released to
the "general public." This is contrasted to a "limited publication"
which allows the author to release his work to an audience of a
29 Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 CoLtrm. L. REv. 185, 187 (1956)
(italicized in original) (footnotes omitted).
:30Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
3lNutt v. National Institute Inc. for the Improvement of Memory,
31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929).32 Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass.
1934).33See Selvin, Should Performance Dedicate?, 42 CALaF. L. REv. 40 (1954).
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limited size, whose use of the work is restricted, while retaining
his common-law rights.34
These two inroads on the concept that publication terminates
common-law rights often make it advantageous for an author to
avoid utilizing the federal statutory protection and to continue the
perpetual common-law protection of his work. Modern methods
of communication and dissemination have made this practice even
more attractive. For example, an author of a play can present
it to an unlimited audience as often as he wishes and never lose
the common-law protection as long as he does not distribute copies.
Using radio and television, he can broadcast around the world and
derive great financial benefit, while never endangering his common-
law rights.
Federal Copyright Protection
As previously stated, common-law protection prior to pub-
lication is specifically acknowledged in the federal copyright statute.
It is, in effect, a grant to the states of the power to act. Federal
statutory protection, obtainable only after publication, gives the
author a monopoly in his work for a limited time.35
From a reading of the constitutional grant of power,36 it seems
clear that Congress could extend federal protection at any time
after the creation of copyrightable matter. By virtue of the Su-
premacy Clause of the Constitution, federal legislation would pre-
empt any common-law rule or state enactment seeking to extend
protection to a work which has entered the purview of the federal
statute.3 7
No state may violate the copyright policy of the United States,
even though that state attempts to do so by exercising its other-
wise lawful powers. For example, many states have attempted to
extend protection to matter not copyrightable under the federal
statute by use of unfair competition legislation. 8 Such schemes
34White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952).
[A] limited publication which communicates the contents of a manu-
script to a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, and
without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale, is
considered a 'limited publication,' which does not result in loss of the
author's common-law right to his manuscript. White v. Kimmell,
supra at 746-47.
35 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
36 U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8.
37 U.S. CONST. art. VI. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land."
3SSee, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918), wherein the Court found the copying of news material, non-
copyrightable matter, by one agency, to be an unfair appropriation of the
labor of the original news gathering agency.
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have, however, generally been rejected. In Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co.,39 the Supreme Court rejected state protection of
items not patentable under the federal law by means of unfair
competition laws.
Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly,
it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair com-
petition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of
the federal patent laws. . . . To allow a State by use of its laws
of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which repre-
sents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the
State to block off from the public something which federal law has
said belongs to the public.40
While Sears involved the federal patent laws and made only pass-
ing reference to the copyright statutes, subsequent case law has
held that state protection of literary property has also been pre-
empted by federal law.41
The federal concept of copyright protection places the public
benefit in a position of prime importance;42 the author's reward,
resulting from his monopoly, is only secondary. The author is
given certain exclusive, enumerated rights,43 but the public may
use the work in any other way it wishes without having to answer
to the author.
By offering the author a period of monopoly in his work and
the opportunity to profit from its use, the federal law seeks to
provide an incentive to utilize the federal system of protection
rather than to continue common-law coverage. Once an author
does seek federal protection, the public benefits since the "limited
times" clause guarantees that the work will eventually enter the
public domain. In return for his monopoly, the author abandons
all exclusivity in his work after the expiration of the statutory
period of protection. Unless given an adequate period of exclusive
use, an author may lack the incentive to publish his work and may
continue to utilize common-law protection. Such avoidance of the
federal scheme might result in public deprivation of much literary
material. Therefore, the "limited time" must be sufficiently long
s9376 U.S. 225 (1964). See also a companion case, Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).4 0 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964).
The Court admitted that the states' power to protect the consumer against
product confusion, by means such as control of labels, was unaffected by
the decision.41 See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc, v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F2d 348 (9th Cir.
1964).
42iFox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932).43 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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to provide incentive for authors, yet short enough not to impair
the public benefit. Under existing law, copyrightable works are
protected 44 for twenty-eight years from the date of first publica-
tion with the opportunity for renewal granted to the author, his
heirs or executors for an additional period of the same length.
4 "
In addition to protecting published works, the federal statute pro-
vides protection for unpublished works through a system of volun-
tary registration.4 6
It is clear that the dual system of copyright protection has
certain inherent problems which have been intensified with the
advent of modern methods of communication. When the present
copyright law was enacted, mass dissemination of literary material
was accomplished mainly by printed copies. The benefits to be
derived by an author who refrained from general publication were
limited and it was generally more advantageous to utilize the fed-
eral protection. Present-day means of dissemination no longer
make publication so attractive since an author can often benefit
financially for a longer period by methods other than the distribu-
tion of copies.
As previously discussed, the extent of state protection of un-
published material greatly differs. This is compounded by the
fact that modern methods of communication permit a work to be
rapidly transmitted across state boundaries and, thus, become sub-
ject to the laws of more than one jurisdiction. In addition, the
conflict between state and federal law is accentuated by the vague
definition of "publication" which has been utilized to determine
the applicability of either form of protection. A further difficulty
founded in the dual system of protection is that federal protection
can be provided only for a limited period while the common law
can extend perpetual protection and still allow broad dissemination
of a work. The author who invokes his federal right to protection
may, in effect, be penalized for so doing. Thus, many authors
avoid publication and the public is deprived of the use of these
works. Such a result is clearly contrary to the constitutional con-
cept of public benefit.
44 Copyright protection is secured by publication of the work containing
notice of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964). After such publication, two
complete copies of the work must be deposited with the Register of Copy-
rights [17 U.S.C. § 13 (1964)] and a claim of copyright must be registered.
17 U.S.C. § 11 (1964). Unless these last two provisions are complied with,
no action may be maintained for copyright infringement.
45 17 U.S.C. §24 (1964). An application for renewal must be made to
the copyright office not more than one year prior to the expiration of the
original term.
46 17 U.S.C § 12 (1964).
[ VOL.. 42
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Federal Copyright Law Revision
Congress, aware of the various shortcomings of the dual sys-
tem, sought to entirely eliminate them in the revision. Three
alternatives have been suggested.
47
The first proposal, and the one which would probably have
been least effective, provided for the continuation of the present
dual system. However, the voluntary registration provisions would
have been broadened to allow registration of all types of unpub-
lished works. Common-law protection would have continued for
any work not registered. While this system had the advantage of
providing protection to any work made available to the public
by means other than publication, it failed in one major respect:
[U]npublished works not voluntarily registered, though widely dis-
seminated by performance or exhibition, would continue to have per-
petual protection under the common law.48
The second method of revision would have retained common-
law protection until "public dissemination" occurred, at which
time federal statutory protection would be available.49  With one
qualification, it was this method which the Register of Copyrights
advocated.
We believe that the constitutional principle of a time limitation should
be applied when a work is disseminated to the public, whether by the
publication of copies or registration, as under the present law, or by
public performance or the public distribution of sound recordings. We
also believe that any statutory limitations imposed in the public interest
on the scope of copyright protection should apply when a work has
been publicly disseminated in any of these ways.50
Undisseminated material, the Register suggested, should continue
to be afforded common-law protection.
This proposal received widespread support since it was not a
drastic change from the existing system. The transition, there-
fore, would be simpler and the procedure under the act would
be more acceptable to those working in the copyright area. How-
47 Strauss, Study No. 29; Protection of Unpublished Works, in 1 STUDIEs
ON COPYRIGHT 189, 217.
48 Strauss, Study No. 29; Protection of Untblished Works, in 1 S=TuEs
ON COPYRIGHT 189, 218.
49 Ibid. "The phrase 'public dissemination' is used here in the sense of
communicating a work to the public visually or accoustically by any method
and in any form, whether permanently fixed or not."
50 REGIsTERa's REPORT 1240. The Register stipulated that "fixation of a
work in some tangible form would be a requirement of its copyrightability."
Id. at 1241.
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ever, the fear that many of the same problems which exist under
the present statute because of the failure to define "publication"
would also arise with the use of a new, undefined (or vaguely
defined) word "dissemination," '1 resulted in rejection of this
method of revision.
The last, and most radical, method contemplated the abolition
of common-law protection for all copyrightable works. Material
would be protected by federal statute from the date of creation
regardless of dissemination or publication. The Register had re-jected this approach as inferior to the dual system of protection,
stating that there were "overbalancing reasons to preserve the
common-law protection of undisseminated works until the author
or his successor chooses to disclose them." 52 The Register felt
that the bulk of undisseminated material was personal correspon-
dence, manuscripts and other private material which the author,
if he so desired, should be able to keep out of the public domain.
Under the third proposal, all works would be subjected to a
statutory period of protection after which they would be available
to the public. There seemed to be a danger that the author of a
private manuscript dealing with a controversial subject might
destroy his work rather than allow it to become available to the
general public and subject himself or his heirs to public comment. 53
The Register further objected to this system since it would require
that the federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction in copyright
matters.5 4 It was his contention that undisseminated works, usually
matters of local concern, should be dealt with by the state courts.
Provisions of the Proposed Law
Despite the objections noted, the drafters of the new legisla-
tion, in seeking to attain the constitutional ends of uniformity of
protection for authors and the furtherance of public benefit through
the advancement of scholarship, adopted the third scheme of
revision.
Under the proposed law, all copyrightable material, whether
published or not, will be protected exclusively by the federal statute
51See, e.g., HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
DIscussIoN AND CO mmENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERA REmSION or THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 74 (Comm. Print
1963).52 REGISTER'S REPORT 1241.
53 Ibid. Realizing, however, that the public has much to gain from some
private manuscripts, the Register thought a compromise could be arranged.
We believe that the right of privacy and the interests of scholarship
can be balanced by a special provision for the use of manuscript
material that is made accessible to the public in a library or other
archive. REGisTER's REPORT 1241,54 Id. at 1242.
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from the time of creation.55 When a work is "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression" 5 it is deemed to have been created. By
extending protection from the day of creation, one major obstacle
encountered in the present law will be removed. It will no longer
be necessary for the courts to struggle to define publication or any
similar term in order to find the division between common-law (or
state) and federal protection.5 7
The preemption section permits neither common-law nor state
protection of any copyrightable work,5s even if that work has been
published and fails to qualify for a federal copyright or has already
passed into the public domain 59 due to the expiration of the
statutory period of protection. This is, in effect, a codification
of the Sears line of cases, holding that the states cannot "block off
from the public something which the federal law has said belongs
to the public." 60
The proposed law, however, does not preempt the common-
law or state legislation in three limited areas: (1) protection of
unpublished materials not copyrightable under the statute (includ-
ing works not "fixed"); (2) in respect to causes of action which
arise prior to the effective date of the statute (January 1, 1969) ;
and, (3) where state action is taken against activities other than
violations of an author's copyright protection.6 ' The first area
indicates the continuance of the Wheaton v. Peters 6 2 doctrine that
publication terminates common-law protection; the last indicates
that the doctrine of the Sears case, admitting the states' power
to prevent unfair competitive practices, has not been abrogated
by the new statute.
Advantages of the Proposed Law
The framers of the new legislation found several major ad-
vantages in a uniform system. 63 First, the uniform system alle-
55 PROPOSED LAW § 301(a).&6 PRoposED LAW § 101.
A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration.
O House RPORT 96.
5s PRoI'osE LAW § 301(a). "[N]o person is entitled to copyright, literary
property rights, or any equivalent legal or equitable right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State."
59 HousE REPoRT 98.60 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
61 PRoPosED LAW § 301(b).
6233 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
63HousE REPoar 96.
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viates the problem of reconciling the differences between state laws
and between state law and federal law. The exclusive federal
provisions will only be subjected to the interpretations of the
federal courts, thus minimizing the danger of conflicts. Unpub-
lished, non-copyrightable material which is left to state control
under the proposed law will generally be of an extremely local
nature and the danger of such matter bringing about a conflict
between the laws of two jurisdictions is minimal. For example,
an impromptu, unrecorded performance before an audience would
not be copyrightable under the proposed legislation and would
fall within the area reserved to the states to provide protection.
Since such a performance is only of a transitory nature, there is
little likelihood that it could be subjected to the laws of any juris-
diction other than the one in which it was performed.
As noted, the new statute eliminates the difficulties involved
in the lack of definition of publication. Since the creation of a
copyrightable work would result in the applicability of the federal
statute and thus federal protection, it would become unnecessary
to continue to determine the point at which a work passes from
the common-law sphere of protection. Of greater significance is
the fact that the broad definition of "creation" gives the proposed
law sufficient latitude to encompass the various means of com-
munications present in our society.
Another advantage of the new system is that it seems to be
more in accord with the constitutional concept of extending pro-
tection to authors for a "limited time." An author will no longer
be able to retain maximum protection by maintaining protection
under the common law. Protection to all authors will be uniform
and no advantage will be gained by avoiding the statutory pro-
visions.""
Conclusion
The preemption provisions of the new copyright bill seem to
benefit both the general public and authors. By providing exclu-
sive federal protection, all works will eventually enter the public
domain. No longer will an author be able to hide under the com-
64A single system of copyright protection is used by most of the nations
of the world and, thus, the new legislation has the further advantage of
aligning the United States with these other nations. The new system will
help insure that no disparity will exist between the protection accorded
foreign authors and that available to domestic authors. For a brief discus-
sion of the concepts of international copyright law see M. NImisR,
COPYRIGHT §65 (1966).
In conjunction with this global uniformity, the new legislation adopts
a longer period of statutory monopoly, protecting a work from the date of
creation until fifty years after the author's death. This is the same period
of protection granted in most other countries. PaorosED LAw § 302.
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mon law and exploit his work without endangering his exclusivity.
Furthermore, the longer period of protection will make the federal
statutory protection more appealing to authors. 5
While the public clearly benefits from the eventual release of
all literary works into the public domain, one aspect of such a
scheme is subject to severe criticism-the release of private papers
and manuscripts. While it is true that after a sufficient period
of time following an author's death the importance of privacy
may decline, there is definitely a strong interest in the individual's
right to protect his private work from the peering eye of the
general public. There is a real danger that many documents such
as private correspondence and diaries, will be destroyed, although
this could be overcome by the retention of such works in libraries
or archives, available to scholars, but removed from the grasp of
the general public.66
One advantageous change which will result from the new
system is that all causes of action involving copyright protection
under the new law will be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts 6 7 thus minimizing the conflicts between court in-
terpretations of the statute.
It seems, in conclusion, that the benefits to be derived from
the proposed scheme of protection greatly outweigh its short-
comings. After too long a wait, the United States seems pre-
pared to equip itself with copyright legislation capable of meeting
the needs of our technologically advanced society.
X
TH E EFFECT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AWARDS ON RECOVERY UNDER MVAIC
The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation Law'
was enacted in 1958 to remedy the failure of New York's then
existing financial responsibility laws2 to protect the innocent
05Under PRoi'osED LAw § 304(a) the time of renewal is extended from
28 to 47 years for those works which are in their first term of copyright
protection when the statute becomes effective.
16 Such a system was urged by the Register. REGisTza's REPoRT 1241.
67 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copy-
rights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent and copyright cases.
' N.Y. Ixs. LAw art. 17-A [hereinafter referred to as MVAIC].
2N.Y. VEHiCLE & TRAgiC LAW art. 6 (Motor Vehicle Financial
Security Act of 1956); N.Y. VEHIcLE & TRAmc LAW art. 7 (Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of 1929).
1967 ] NOTES
